Different elements in the reception history of German Idealism have had different impacts -such as the Young Hegelians on the philosophy of religion, NeoKantianism on the philosophy of science, Kojève on accounts of recognition, Croce on theories of art, and so on. When it comes to the British Idealists, arguably the most obvious candidate for such impact is in the idea of 'my station and its duties'; for while the British Idealists engaged with many aspects of the thought of both Kant and Hegel (and to a lesser degree also of Fichte and Schelling), it seems that it is their notion of 'my station and its duties' that has the greatest resonance today, while their accounts of the Absolute, of relations, of the concrete universal, and other aspects of their idealist metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind have been largely forgotten. ii For, while it is widely used as a slogan to represent both their ethical and political philosophy and that of idealism more generally, and while it is of continuing influence within certain strands of contemporary ethical and political thinking as an alternative to other approaches, iii it is rarely given any detailed treatment in historical terms. iv In particular, I would like to ask precisely what theory of duty or obligation this position is meant to embody: that is, how an appeal to this notion is meant to answer a fundamental question in ethical theory, namely how moral obligation is to be accounted for and best understood. It is most usually assumed, I think, that in tying obligations to social roles, the British Idealists were offering what I will call an identificatory account of obligation: that is, acting in a certain way has an obligatory force because it relates to a role which constitutes your identity. I will contrast this sort of theory with two other accounts, which I will call hybrid accounts and social command accounts -and suggest that in fact Green held the former and Bradley the latter; and I will also argue that this puts Green's account of obligation close to Kant's, while Bradley may be seen to be following Hegel (who therefore, like Bradley, should also not be seen as offering an identificatory account, 2 which is often mistakenly what happens when his position comes to be viewed in Bradleyean terms).
Despite being frequently grouped together, and despite sharing many ideas and concerns, there are also significant differences between Green and Bradley. This is sometimes characterized by the suggestion that while Green was fundamentally Kantian, Bradley was more Hegelian.
viii While there is some truth in this (reflected, as
we shall see, in their different accounts of obligation), neither followed their respective predecessors in any very orthodox way, nor conceived themselves as doing so -Green insisting that he was at best offering a 'friendly amendment' to Kant's approach in order to save him from himself, ix while Bradley openly criticized Hegel despite nonetheless acknowledging his great significance.
x And both, of course, came under other important influences, some arguably close to Hegel (such as Aristotle and Spinoza), but others arguably not (such as the British Empiricists). At the same time,
as is common, neither liked to feel themselves pigeonholed into a movement or reduced to any form of discipleship -Bradley famously warning in the Preface to the first edition of his Principles of Logic that 'As for the "Hegelian School" which exists in our reviews, I know of no one who has met it anywhere else'. xi Certainly, unlike some of the British Idealists (such as McTaggart), Green and Bradley published no scholarly works on the German Idealists, but clearly the latter helped to provide some of the key materials and ideas that they shaped after their own fashion, in response to their own concerns and against the background of their own assumptions -where one common point of focus was on the question of moral obligation.
Theories of moral obligation
How moral duty and obligation is to be understood has of course been a matter of long-standing debate within philosophy. In the medieval period, and into much of the early modern period too, there were fundamentally three major options in accounting for moral obligation. According to radically voluntarist divine command accounts, the obligatoriness of morality depends on the authority of some divine sovereign or commander, who has the freedom and power to make any act obligatory by so commanding. On natural law accounts, by contrast, the idea is that morality constitutes a natural law in which God plays a more indirect role, where an act is made right and hence something we are obliged to do because it conforms to the nature of things, where God is the source of that nature as creator, but not the source that what is right only becomes an actual obligation through God's willing that it be done (hence opposing the natural law tradition, which gave God's will a less direct role), but that rightness itself is prior to and independent of obligatoriness and hence of God's will (hence opposing any radical voluntarism, as what God can command is now constrained by what is right independent of that command).
Theories of obligation as they arise in more modern philosophy may be seen to grow out from, but also to break with, these more classical positions in different ways -where it is then these more modern theories that will concern us in considering
Green and Bradley and their accounts of duty.
The first such theory can be found in Kant, and I will call it the hybrid theory because, like the intermediate divine command theory (of which I think it is a descendent), it combines a theory of the right with a separate theory of obligation. (Of course, like everything in Kant's philosophy in general and ethics in particular, what I say here is hardly uncontentious, and I will do little to defend the reading in any detail, though I try to do so elsewhere. xii And even if my reading of Kant is deemed unacceptable, at least perhaps it will prove a useful background to my account of
Green.) As is well know, Kant raises the question of how to explain the peculiar force that morality has for us, which takes the form of duties and obligations -that is, of commands and imperatives, telling is that there are actions which we must or must not perform. Kant calls this feature of morality 'necessitation' or 'constraint' (Nötigung), and he explains it not by recourse to divine command (in the manner of a voluntarist like Crusius), or to the inherent obligatoriness of the natural order of things (in the manner of a rationalist like Wolff), but in terms of the distinction between the holy will and our own, arguing that it is because we have dispositions to do things other than what is right, that the right for us involves a moral 'must'; but for a holy will, which has no inclination to do anything other than what is right, no such 'must' applies. A typical statement of Kant's view is the following from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals:
A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the 'ought'
is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for example, of the human will.
1xiii Thus, the principles that determine what it is good and bad to do apply to the holy will, where these principles are laws because they hold of all agents universally, and of such agents independently of the contingencies of their desires and goals, and thus necessarily. However, because the holy will is morally perfect, these laws lack any necessitating force for wills of this sort, whereas our lack of moral perfection means that they possess such force for us. It can therefore be seen how Kant's distinction between the holy will and ours is designed to resolve the problem of obligation, by appeal to the fact that our will is divided between reason and inclination in a way that the will of the divine being is not. Kant characterizes this division in the terms of his transcendental idealism as mapping onto the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal realms (or the 'intelligible world' and 'the world of sense'). Kant's distinction between the holy will and ours therefore forms a crucial part of his answer to the problem of accounting for the moral 'must', in a way that explains its possibility (unlike a view that simply treats the 'must' as a feature of the world), but without recourse to the problematic notion of a divine legislator as the source of that 'must' (thus avoiding any need to adopt a divine command theory). where 'these substantial determinations are duties which are binding on the will of the individual'. 4xvii Because of the authority of these duties over the lives of individuals, and of the relative unimportance of individuals within the social order, it can appear to them that the moral law has a divine origin, as it did in premodern societies. But this is to neglect the social basis of these obligations, and that while the social order is a substance to which individuals relate as 'accidents', nonetheless these accidents are required by the substance in order to be actual. Hegel makes clear, therefore, that he sees divine command accounts of obligation as based on a picture of our relation to the world that has been surpassed, where these obligations are now better accounted for as an aspect of our existence within the social environment of ethical life. As a result of the 'laws and powers' of the community, therefore, the individual will find duties that are 'prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him within his situation'.
5xviii
These ethical laws may then appear to have 'an absolute authority and power, infinitely more firmly based than the being of nature'. 6xix At the same time, however, Hegel argues that in so far as they stem from the ethical community, such laws are 'not something alien to the subject' but something to which Korsgaard. This is reflected in her conception of practical identity, which is 'a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking'. xxi Some of these identities can be, and for most will be, tied in with an individual's social roles, whist others (such as 'being a human being') may not:
Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, someone's lover or friend, and so on. Now, if one starts with an identificatory account of obligation, and also takes on board the idea that our identity can be grounded in such things as our social roles, then it may seem natural to assume that any focus on the latter with lead one on to the former: and many social role theorists do indeed take this route. Thus, while
Korsgaard herself takes it that our identity as humans is more fundamental than any mere social role, nonetheless she accepts the latter would give rise to obligations were we to identify with them (as she admits can happen to the Mafioso raised as an example against her by G. A. Cohen). xxv A similar outlook can also be found in other social role theorists, such as John Horton, who writes: '[B]oth the family and the political community figure prominently in our sense of who we are; our self-identity and our understanding of our place in the world…It should not be surprising, therefore, that some institutional obligations, through their deep-rooted connections with our sense of who we are and our place in the world, have a particularly fundamental role in our moral being. That these kind of institutional involvement generate moral obligations, and these obligations rather than standing in need of justification may themselves be justificatory, is only to be expected'. found ourselves when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social organism… If we suppose the world of relations, in which [an Englishman] was born and bred, never to have been, then we suppose the very essence of him not to be; if we take that away, we have taken him away… The state…gives him the life that he does and ought to live'. xxvii But I now want to argue that this identificatory account of Green and Bradley is mistaken, and that the former is much more plausibly read as following Kant's hybrid approach, and the latter as following Hegel's social command theory. I will begin by discussing Green.
Green on duty
In order to understand Green's account of duty, it is necessary to say something first about his general position in ethics.
Green begins with an account of action, where he argues that what guides the will it not some specific want or desire, but a conception of the agent's own greatest good -hence, he claims, the agent in acting aims at 'self-satisfaction'.
xxviii Thus, taking Esau selling his birthright for a mess of pottage as an example, Green argues that his motive for action was not mere hunger, for otherwise he would have been acting like an unreflective animal; rather, what led him to act was 'the presentation of an idea of himself as enjoying the pleasure of eating the pottage', where 'it is not the hunger as a natural force, but his own conception of himself, as finding for the time his greatest good in the satisfaction of hunger, that determines the act'. xxix As a result of this, Green argues, Esau 'recognises himself as the author of the act', and hence praise or blame are appropriate. xxx For Green, therefore, when it comes to making a choice, there is no selection between competing desires made by the will; rather, the choice is made in determining which of the desires, if satisfied, would constitute the agent's greatest good, and on the basis of this decision the will then comes to act, with the other desires having been silenced.
xxxi As a consequence of this picture, Green resists any strict division between the roles of desire and intellect in action (for example, he rejects the Humean view that reason is the slave of the passions, simply engaged in finding the means for the satisfaction of the latter). xxxii For, intellect plays a role in forming the conception of our good within which a desire can then play a part -as when Esau takes it that his desire for food, if satisfied, would realize that good. On the other hand, if an agent did not believe that desire satisfaction of any kind formed part of his good, then that agent would be inert. Green therefore argues that the will is not a faculty somehow separable from desire and intellect, but rather contains aspects of both, where this must be so in an agent that is seeking to bring about its self-satisfaction. namely, what is it that distinguishes a morally good will from a morally bad one? Of course, on some accounts, this difference is marked by a distinction between the good agent who has no concern for their own well-being, and a bad one who is so concerned: but Green cannot take this option, given his account of action outlined above where such self-concern is present in all agents -so where does the difference lie? Green's answer is that the difference comes from the different conceptions of self-satisfaction that agents can have, and thus in 'the character of that in which selfsatisfaction is sought, ranging from sensual pleasure to the fulfilment of a vocation conceived as given by God'. He goes on: 'It is on the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction that the [moral] quality of the will must depend. It is here therefore that we must seek for the basis for a distinction between goodness and badness of will'. xxxiv Green's position depends, therefore, on making out some grounds on which to distinguish good and bad conceptions of selfsatisfaction that might be held by different agents, where this explains the basis on which we might make a moral distinction between them. In order to pursue this strategy, Green therefore rejects other accounts, such as hedonistic utilitarianism, which holds that all agents have the same conception of self-satisfaction, namely the gaining of pleasure, and which therefore distinguishes good and bad agents extrinsically rather than intrinsically, on the basis only of the consequences of their actions. It is this conception of their good which the virtuous agent holds, as opposed to the conception adopted by the vicious agent, that leads the former into virtue and the latter into vice. xxxvi What makes an agent good for Green, therefore, is not how much he actually achieves, but whether he is looking for his self-satisfaction in the right place.
Though, of course, there is much more to be said, and many possible objections to be answered, this completes all that is needed as the background for Green's account of duty, to which we now turn. This is given primarily at the end of
Chapter II and the start of Chapter III of Book III of the Prolegomena.
As we have seen, Green holds that the good agent aims at the realization of his capacities, where he now argues that this 'will keep before him an object, which he presents to himself as absolutely desirable, but which is other than any particular object of desire'.
xxxvii In the case of such particular objects, he will take these to have value only in so far as they satisfy some desire of his; but in the case of his selfrealization, '[i]t will be an interest as in an object conceived to be of unconditional value; one of which the value does not depend on any desire that the individual may at any time feel for it or for anything else, or on any pleasure that, either in its pursuit or in its attainment or as its result, he may experience'. xxxviii In other words, Green
claims that while the agent may see the value of everything else in terms of his wants and their attendant pleasures, he does not see the realization of his capacities in this way, as these constitute the end against which such wants and pleasures are measured, where 'the desire for the object will be founded in a conception of its desirableness as a fulfilment of the capabilities of which a man is conscious in being conscious of himself'. xxxix Given this picture, then, Green argues that agents can be in the position of seeing their self-realization as of unconditioned value, which is not valuable as a means to the satisfaction of some prior desire, but on the contrary can overrule any desire that does not tend to the attainment of this end:
In such men [as are conscious of the value of self-realization] and at such times as a desire for it does actually arise…it will express itself in their imposition on themselves of rules requiring something to be done irrespectively of any inclination to do it, irrespectively of any desired end to which it is a means, other than this end, which is desired because conceived as absolutely desirable. With the men in whom, and at the times when, there is no such desire, the consciousness of there being something absolutely desirable will still be a qualifying element in life. It will yield a recognition of those unconditional rules of conduct to which, from the prevalence of unconformable passions, it fails to produce actual obedience. It will give meaning to the demand, without which there is no morality and in which all morality is virtually involved, that 'something be done merely for the sake of its being done,' because it is a consciousness of the possibility of an action in which no desire shall be gratified but the desire excited by the idea of the act itself, as of something absolutely desirable in the sense that in it the man does the best that he has in him to do. where what underlies morality is some unconditional value, but where that morality appears to us in the form of commands in so far as we are subject to desires that lead us to want to act differently, in pursuit of other ends.
Moreover, in Chapter III, Green goes on to explain why he takes the hybrid model to be more fundamental than any divine command or social command account.
He begins by underlining that, because self-realization is a social matter, ethics will involve social relations. To the individual, therefore, a life of this sort will 'express itself in the form of social requirement', in so far as his 'better reason' will be 'in antagonism to the inclination of the moment', xliv where as a result the individual will feel himself to be under some sort of moral law governing his relations with others.
Thus, Green argues, while it may seem natural to associate law with the idea of some sort of authoritative commander (as on the divine command and social command models), this natural picture should be resisted, where the hybrid account reveals why in fact it is unnecessary, as it shows how the imperative of 'Thou shalt' and 'Thou must' can be explained in a different way. xlv Green suggests, therefore, that rather than arising in a legalistic manner, out of the authority over us of some superior commander, the moral ought arises out of a prior awareness of the good, but where that good stands opposed to some of the agent's desires and inclinations and thus puts constraints on them, in a way that comes to assume the form of an imperative, even though the agent need not yet have any conception of a law or a sovereign lawgiver.
Moreover, Green argues, it is this model that must truly be the fundamental one. For, he holds, any lawgiver account must explain the authority of the lawgiver, which cannot come from fear of their power as such fear does make this authority legitimate in any way; instead, Green claims, it can only arise if we see the lawgiver as following the good -but then the appeal to the lawgiver is made redundant, as on the hybrid model this already has its own imperatival force, as explained above.
xlvi Rather than being constrained by an external lawgiver, therefore, for Green (as for Kant) moral obligatoriness is to be explained by appeal to the structure of the agent's own will, as her conception of the good limits her desires, in a way that makes it appropriate to talk of self-legislation.
xlvii
We have seen, then, that while Green's position is by no means that of the fully orthodox (or literal) Kantian, insofar as he treats self-satisfaction as a basis for the moral will, nonetheless his account of the moral 'must' still takes a Kantian form,
in following the hybrid model we found in Kant, rather than any sort of divine command, social command, or identificatory position. Turning now to Bradley, we will see that he too eschews any identificatory account, but that he also rejects a Kantian one, opting instead for a social command theory which puts him closer to Hegel.
Bradley on duty
Whilst the Prolegomena to Ethics and Bradley's Ethical Studies stand as the twin peaks of Idealist ethics in Britain, and while they share important similarities of outlook, the relation between the texts is not straightforward, while they are also significantly different in the approaches they adopt. Ethical Studies appeared nearly a decade before the Prolegomena; but Bradley attended Green's lectures on ethics and related matters in Oxford, as did most of the other British Idealists who were therefore fully versed in the position developed by Green, so that Ethical Studies cannot be said to have had an independent influence on them despite its earlier publication.
Moreover, Bradley here acknowledges the significance of Green, particularly when it comes to his treatment of hedonism in Essay III xlviii -although Bradley is not mentioned in the Prolegomena. xlix Ethical Studies, unlike the Prolegomena, is a work with a dialectical structure in the Hegelian sense; that is, positions are advanced but then 'aufgehoben' or sublated once their limitations are revealed, so that in this way the search for a more complete and less one-sided position is carried out. The book comprises seven main chapters (or 'Essays' as they are headed). In the first, Bradley defends the idea of moral responsibility against the twin threats of philosophical determinism and indeterminism, while in the second he turns to the question of 'why should I be moral?'. Anticipating Prichard, l Bradley suggests that taken as a demand by a sceptic who want to know 'what's in it for me?', the question should be avoided, as the attempt to answer it will only reduce morality to self-interest -while the moral person will feel no need to ask it. On the other hand, Bradley allows that there can be some genuine and legitimate point to the question, which is how far morality coincides with self-realization, and in what form. How best to answer this question then becomes the main focus of the rest of the book.
Bradley begins his inquiry by considering hedonistic utilitarianism as an
answer, which is then rejected for reasons we will come back to, where he then considers the opposite view, which is that morality is all about 'duty for duty's sake'. In the fifth chapter, which is the one entitled 'My Station and Its Duties', a position is adopted that Bradley represents as a kind of 'sublation' of hedonistic utilitarianism and 'duty for duty's sake'. However, in the next chapter he faces up to certain difficulties with this position, which revolve around the idea that there is more to morality and self-realization than the social world encompasses -such as the obligations of the artist to create works of beauty -which Bradley puts within an 'ideal morality'. Finally, the last chapter considers 'Selfishness and Self-Sacrifice'
and how the former relates to the bad self and the latter to the good, while the 'Concluding Remarks' consider how far '[r]eflection on morality leads beyond it', li and takes us to a religious perspective. While as this shows, the outlook of 'my station and its duties' does not represent Bradley's final position, it is here that the core of his account of ethical duties lies and it is therefore on this chapter that the identificatory accounts of his position have focused -so this will also form the centrepiece of our discussion, but where, in accordance with the structure of the book, this cannot properly be understood without taking into account the dialectic that has preceded it. Bradley considers various difficulties with other elements of the theory (particularly its 'empty formalism'), but also focuses on its dualism, which he thinks creates problems both for the account of action (which, like Green, he takes to involve both the sensuous self as well as the non-sensuous self), but also for the very account it offers of the imperatival nature of morality, which (contra Green) he takes to involve some notion of a commander, where on the hybrid model this idea makes no real sense:
We may remark in passing a contradiction involved in the doctrine of the imperative [that comes from this 'dualistic moral theory']. A command is addressed by one will to another, and must be obeyed, if at all, by the second will. But here the will that is commanded is not the will that executes; hence the imperative is never obeyed; and, as it is not to produce action in that to which it is addressed, it is a mere sham-imperative.
lvi
There is no explicit mention of Green here, so we therefore cannot say for sure that
Bradley took him to be a target; but as we have seen, despite their important differences, when it comes to the imperatival nature of duty Green has a position of a broadly Kantian sort, so one might expect Bradley's critique to apply also to him.
Having seen that Bradley rejects the Kantian hybrid model, the question now is what is he seeking to replace it with in moving to a discussion of 'my station and its duties'? As has been discussed, a standard approach is to take it that Bradley moves instead to an identificatory model; but I now want to suggest that this approach is mistaken, and that underlying this position is a social command account instead.
That this is so can be made plain once one recalls the structure of the dialectic in Ethical Studies, and the place of the chapter (or 'essay') on 'My Station and its Duties' within it. Up to this point, Bradley has considered two contrasting approaches, both of which are said to have some merit, but neither of which is wholly satisfactory as things stand. The first is 'pleasure for pleasure's sake', which has the merit of thinking about how morality might relate to the individual's 'self-realization', but does so in way that has a narrow and mistaken view of what this amounts to, namely pleasure. The second is 'duty for duty's sake', which rightly scorns the latter idea as simplistic, and instead conceives of the self to be realized as the pure will, and so conceives of morality in terms that are purely formal. Again, according to Bradley, there is some merit to thinking of morality in terms of duty, but as we have seen for familiar Hegelian reasons (including the dualism we have discussed above), it is deemed unsatisfactory.
What is needed, therefore, is some sort of synthesis or 'Aufhebung' of these views, which Bradley tries to offer in 'My Station in Its Duties': namely, a position that has a conception of duty that overcomes the problems with the Kantian outlook, and which also relates it to a notion of self-realization that is less crude than the one offered by the perspective of 'pleasure for pleasure's sake'. What we require, then, is a view that allows for self-realization on the one hand, and duty on the other, without treating the former as mere pleasure or hedonistic well-being, and the latter as something empty, formal and dualistic -where it is precisely in a view that tries to achieve both, that these respective limitations will be overcome. Bradley's positive suggestion, therefore, is that if we think of the individual as following duties that relate to a good that is more than his individual good, then at the same time selfrealization will be achieved, and these duties will be given a content and context, in a way that will enable a satisfactory 'middle way' to be found.
And then, Bradley claims, this is just what one will get within a state, in which the individual is both part of the general good of the community, and also able to find itself fully realized by participating in that community as a result. Thus, Bradley declares, in a passage of considerable rhetorical force, by living within a 'social organism' of this sort, where the individual has a 'station and its duties' through which they contribute to this goal, and therefore also has contentful and objective requirements laid upon them, by a society in which they also flourishes, then a notable advance towards dialectical stability will have been achieved:
Here, and here first, are the contradictions which have beset us solved -here is a universal which can confront our wandering desires with a fixed and stern imperative, but which yet is no unreal form of the mind, but a living soul that penetrates and stands fast in the detail of actual existence. It is real, and real for me. It is in its affirmation that I affirm myself, for I am but as a 'heart-beat in its system'. And I am real in it; for when I give myself to it, it gives me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life which is happiness. In the realized idea which, superior to me, and yet here and now in and by me, affirms itself in a continuous process, we have found the end, we have found self-realization, duty, and happiness in one -yes, we have found ourselves, when we have found our station and its duties, our function as an organ in the social organism. lvii My claim is, then, that up to this point, Bradley is offering a social command account, whereby on the one hand the state is such as to 'confront our wandering desires with a strict and firm imperative' because of its authority over us, but where on the other hand 'when I give myself up to it', the state 'gives me the fruition of my own personal 8lix It is precisely this, as we have seen, that allows Hegel to also strike the balance that Bradley is after, between duty as imposed by the state on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other, so that by having the source of those duties in the command of the rational state, the individual has obligations, has their 'particularity' taken into account, and is lifted above the narrow and egoistic concerns of the pre-social individual. By thinking of duty in these terms, as imposed by society on the individual who has a place and role within it, the dialectical harmony that both Hegel and Bradley are looking for can be achieved, but only because obligations are seen to arise from the social community of which they are part, and which has the self-realization or freedom of its citizens (which for Bradley and Hegel are in effect the same thing) at its heart.
However, if this shows him to be a social command theorist, what of the passages in which Bradley seems to make so much of the way in which an individual's identity is bound up with their role, and which have led so many to interpret him as a social role theorist concerning obligation?
When it comes to Bradley, I think the simple answer is as follows: These 'identificatory' passages are there not to support a social role theory, but to answer three very significant objection to any social command theory, namely: (a) that the state which Bradley claims has the authority to give individuals their duties does not really exist and is a myth, because it can always be reduced to a mere collection of individuals, with nothing but the authority of individuals over one another (b) that self-realization does not require social membership, so that there is no essential connection (as Bradley claims there is) between a morality of social duties and self-realization In short, man is a social being; he is real only because he is social, and can realize himself only because it is as social that he realized himself. The mere individual is a delusion of theory; and the attempt to realize it in practice is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the production of monstrosities. Bradley's response to the reductionist objection that there cannot be any social commands, because 'in fact' there is no social organism, is that the reduction cannot work, as without the social organism there is 'in fact' no individual. What we see in this talk of identity and one's place in society, therefore, is not a defense of an identificatory theory of obligation, but a defense of the idea of society that is needed by the kind of social command theory that Bradley has put forward earlier in the chapter. It is also needed to substantiate his crucial link between duty and selfrealization, which on the individualist position does not require the person to have any place within a social whole, while it also shows that this social will is not alien to the agent's own will.
Bradley thus uses his 'identificatory' claims as a way of supporting his anti- xxiv Korsgaard, Sources, : 'You may be tempted to do something but find that it is inconsistent with your identity as a teacher or a mother or a friend, and the thought that it is inconsistent may give rise to a new incentive, an incentive not to do this thing. As Luther's "here I stand, I cannot do otherwise" reminds us, the human heart, being human, discovers itself not only in spontaneous desire, but in imperatives'. lii Bradley emphasizes the importance of the structure of the work, when he writes that 'These Essays are a critical discussion of some fundamental questions in Ethics, and are so far connected that, for the most part, they must be read in the order in which they stand ' (Ethical Studies, viii . Bradley writes on p. 234: 'Morality does involve a contradiction; it does tell you to realize that which never can be realized, and which, if realized, does efface itself as such. No one ever was or could be perfectly moral; and if he were, he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection there is no ought, where there is no ought there is no morality, where there is no self-contradiction there is no ought. The ought is a self-contradiction'. 
